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Introduction 
 
This study intends to explore how a member state shapes the development of the 
European Union (EU) strategic culture. By answering this question, this thesis aims to 
make a contribution to better understanding of what is the EU strategic culture and 
what can be possible development of it after Brexit will be accomplished.  
A direct premise that raises the importance of this question was British decision to 
leave the EU expressed in the referendum in 2016. Great Britain as one of the most 
powerful member states in the European Union as well as a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council and a long-standing ally of the United States has 
always played an important role in shaping the security architecture in Europe. 
Common knowledge suggests that the United Kingdom has been advocating for limited 
military capabilities of the European Union which contributed to the low level of 
integration in the area of security and defense. Following this logic, one could conclude 
that lack of Great Britain in the EU will inevitably lead to a change of the EU’s strategic 
culture since the UK will not be able anymore to influence the EU’s approach to 
Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP). As a result, one could conclude that the 
UK will not be able anymore to influence the EU’s approach to Common Defense and 
Security Policy (CSDP) and thus the EU strategic culture.  
However, this stance does not reflect the complexity of strategic culture. It 
encompasses not only issues related narrowly to the deployment of armed force 
abroad. The sources of strategic culture can be of different kinds; therefore it might 
also be a case that the impact of UK on the EU strategic culture will preserve in some 
form even after the final exit of the Union. It is especially because of the multi-faceted 
activity of the European Union abroad that includes issues such as development aid, 
crisis management or special operations. If the UK has shaped the EU strategic culture 
in a way of developing not strictly military capabilities, it has arguably more permanent 
character that would be thought at first glance. It is only strengthened by the fact that 
strategic culture comprises such elements as habits (human or institutional), existing 
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procedures, and the experience of a given community of political and bureaucratic 
establishments. In other words, the strategic culture of the European Union (as other 
strategic cultures) does not rely exclusively on top-political or military decisions taken 
by narrow circles of current leadership.  
Based on the above, the research question of the thesis is how the United Kingdom 
(UK) has shaped the EU’s strategic culture. The study hypothesizes that the elements 
of the UK’s strategic culture are reflected at the EU level. Moreover, these elements 
are to be seen in critical moments of developing the EU strategic culture that is 
selected, the EU, strategic documents: Maastricht Treaty, European Defense Strategy 
of 2003, and A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy of 2016.     
The thesis is divided into three main parts:  
1. The first part includes discussion of the existing literature on the concept of 
strategic culture including the strategic culture of a state as well as the 
European Union. The aim of this overview is to bring main approaches to study 
of strategic culture. It contributes to pointing out existing lacks and difficulties 
in conducting research on strategic culture. The research design of the thesis 
was built upon diagnosed (by other authors) obstacles in exploring the strategic 
culture. This part includes also a supplementary concept introduced to the 
research – Europeanization. The concept (especially bottom-up 
Europeanization) is chosen to explain how a member states transfer its own 
attitude towards strategic culture on the EU level. 
2. The second part contains the explanation of a research design adapted for the 
study. The thesis tries to address one of the most significant problems in 
studying strategic culture – lack of proper methodological apparatus. The 
innovation of the study lies in the method chosen (process tracing) and putting 
main emphasis not on “what” question (e.g. what is the EU strategic culture) 
but how it is being developed (on the assumption that the EU strategic culture 
is a concept that is in the process of making rather than already set). In contrast 
to other studies, in this thesis strategic culture is a dependent variable. While 
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an independent variable is the UK’s uploading (namely, the process in which 
United Kingdom attempts to transfer the elements of own strategic thinking at 
the EU level). This part includes also a description of sources and 
operationalization.   
3. The third part contains how the UK has shaped the EU’s strategic culture. The 
method adopted in the study requires pointing out the moments in time that 
the process of shaping the EU strategic culture by the UK is seen. Therefore, the 
timeline of the study comprises of three such moments: Maastricht Treaty; the 
European Defense Strategy of 2003 and A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign 
and Security Policy of 2016. These critical moments are chosen particularly to 
make an investigation if the UK’s expectations towards the EU strategic culture 
had been materialized in three documents of major importance for the EU 
defense and security policy and the use of force. This analysis will be preceded 
by the discussion on the elements of the UK strategic culture in order to make 
sort of comparative scale of the content of EU documents and the UK attitude 
towards strategic culture. 
Finally, the study closes with a conclusion in which it discusses findings and assesses 
how United Kingdom has shaped the process of developing the EU strategic culture in 
all selected critical moments. Additional assessment will be devoted to the research 
method with an indication of the possibility of its possible application in future 
research.    
 
  
 
 
 
 
6 
 
Part I.  Theoretical framework: the Europeanization of strategic 
culture 
 
1.1 The concept of strategic culture  
 
What is strategic culture?  
Although strategic culture has been introduced to the field of political science in the 
1970s, the content that the concept is supposed to explain had been studied even 
earlier. Moreover, it will not be probably an exaggeration to say that strategic culture 
deals with immanent part of a state’s activity – the attitude and readiness to use 
military force (Snyder: 1977; Gray: 1999). More specifically, the elements that are 
considered as the sources of strategic culture such as geographical location, historical 
experience or existing political and administrative institutions (Uz Zaman: 2009) were 
in use even before the concept occurred itself. This statement applies to modern 
states as well as to pre-modern forms of political organizations of different kinds.  
Therefore, when we talk about strategic culture we deal with the important element of 
politics – the organization of the use of violence.  
Strategic culture has gained, over time, different approaches and applicabilities (see 
for instance Klein’s article on a theory of strategic culture: 1991; the main arguments 
of realism and constructivism in regards to EU strategic culture one may find in 
Rynning: 2003; Lantis: 2002). A repetitive element of these works is an attempt to 
explain what are circumstances in which the state is ready to use its armed forces. It is 
worthy to note that it refers not to the entire coercive apparatus that is at a state’s 
disposal. Strategic culture is applied rather to external relations with other states or 
international subjects.  
Therefore,  strategic culture concerns particularly such issues like waging a war, 
deployment of forces abroad, defense of borders. What strategic culture brings is an 
attempt to put all different motivations and scenarios of using a state’s military forces 
under one roof. Strategic culture is seeking a link between the historical or cultural 
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experience of a given political organization and the willingness (or lack of it) to use 
force. It bridges material and non-material factors with using armed forces.  
Most works on strategic culture are devoted to the category of the state as a 
fundamental actor of international relations. This approach is understandable since 
the type of culture is also very often associated with the concept of nation. It does not 
exclude, however, the attempts to apply the concept also to non-state actors, the 
European Union (EU) included (Biava, Drent & Herd: 2011; Rynning: 2003; Haine: 
2011). It is notably observed in the post-Cold War period when the concept found 
growing interest among political scientists representing especially (but not only) 
a constructivist approach to international relations.  
The first part of the study is designated to bring theoretical foundations of the concept 
alongside with another supplementary concept of the thesis – Europeanization, in 
regards to the strategic culture that is analyzed from top-down as well as bottom-up 
perspectives. The latter perspective is sometimes depicted in the literature as 
uploading (Börzel, 2003) and this term will be mostly used in the thesis since the main 
focus here is on how member states shape the EU level and not to another way 
around.  
It is worthy to note, however, that the idea of the EU’s strategic culture has its 
adherents (Cornish and Edwards: 2001; Norheim-Martinsen: 2011, while some authors 
remain critical about the applicability of the concept to the EU (Haine: 2011; list of 
obstacles in establishing of the EU strategic culture also in Biava, Drent & Herd: 2011; 
Rynning: 2003; Haine: 2011). Critics sometimes put into a question even the general 
ability to develop own strategic culture by the EU, since strategic assets are still mostly 
under control of member states instead of the supranational bodies. Therefore, it 
seems to be necessary at this point to say that this thesis assumes different 
perspective. This perspective is built on the stance that the process of building up the 
EU’s defense capabilities already proves that it is justified to pursue an academic 
inquiry on the EU strategic culture which is, almost by definition, in statu nascendi 
concept. Furthermore, according to some authors, there is no convincing argument in 
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the literature that the EU strategic culture cannot be developed (Cornish and Edwards: 
2001). They argue that the development of the EU strategic culture has fastened after 
Helsinki European Council in 1999 (ibid).  
Arguably, the most likely situation that EU member states and the EU as a separate 
subject are facing currently is that the EU-level community logic influences the national 
strategic cultures (of each member state and this is “downloading), as well as each 
member state, has the potential to affect the EU strategic culture (and this is 
“uploading”). The researcher’s task is to analyze whether and to what extent these two 
processes are influencing each other and what are particularly the consequences of 
such interdependence, while this study is limited to explain the process of “uploading” 
a strategic culture.  
How did the debate on strategic develop? 
Political and military leaders have always been involved in the process of establishing 
a framework for the use of force. Until today, academic works dealing with strategy, 
war, or defense refer to such classics like Carl von Clausewitz’s “On War” (Vom Kriege) 
or Sun Tzu’s “The Complete Art of War”. These two famous books show 
simultaneously two different approaches to the use of force: “Western” (Clausewitz) 
and “non-Western” (“Chinese” – Sun Tzu). Another seminal example that is used to 
show the roots of Western thought of warfare is “The History of the Peloponnesian 
War” of Athenian historian Thucydides. While the extensive historical analysis of the 
roots of strategy and strategic culture is not an aim of this study, an interested reader 
may find already a useful guidance (including authors of Eastern and Western cultural 
circles)  in others works on strategic culture (see for example: Uz Zaman: 2009; Klein: 
1991).  
In the mid-20th century onwards, scholars renewed attention to the relationship 
between culture and state behavior. In a certain simplification, it can be pointed out 
that what is currently being researched using strategic culture, has been associated 
also with such concepts as a political culture (Berger: 1995) and national character 
(Klein: 1991). Klein argues that national style was used to underline the importance of 
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existing habits of thinking and behaving of military leadership. Whilst Berger contends 
in a similar fashion that political culture can be understood as an interplay between 
norms and political institutions. On the one hand, institutions can contribute to rooting 
some norms or beliefs in society. On the other hand, culture can exert pressure on 
institutions and their way of functioning as well as culture legitimizes institutions and 
equips them in particular meaning (Berger: 1998 in Lantis: 2002).   
Arguably, this interplay described by Berger is to be seen also at the EU level. EU 
politicians and servants are socialized in their national/ regional cultures. In this sense, 
they become a transmission belt of certain values or patterns of behaving at 
supranational (EU) level. Obviously, once the institutions were established they started 
to influence in the reverse direction as well. Whilst among member states some of 
them enjoy greater ability to shape the EU agenda than others. This study claims that 
United Kingdom is the one that possesses the greater ability to affect the EU’s 
decision-making process.  
According to Lantis, the notion of political culture was first introduced by Almond and 
Sidney Verba as a “subset of beliefs and values of a society that relate to political 
system”(Lantis: 2002, p. 90). Whilst Uz Zaman recalls the study of Colin Gray in which 
he stated that the idea of a national character emerges in a logical way from the 
concept of political culture, since particular culture should influence a “particular style 
of thought and action” (Uz Zaman: 2009, p. 70; see also Gray: 1984).   
In his article on strategic culture Lantis (2002) has carried out insightful analysis of 
different approaches to strategic culture. He argues that studies on national characters 
conducted in the 1940s onwards had established an important link between culture 
and state behavior. These studies, according to Lantis, applied anthropological models 
of analysis. Lantis describes also political culture as one of the core “enduring and 
controversial alternative theoretical explanation of state behavior” (Lantis: 2002, p. 
90). As he further puts it, political culture considers “commitment to values like 
demographic principles and institutions, ideas about morality, and the use of force, the 
rights of individuals or collectivities, or predispositions toward the role of a country in 
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global politics”. In such a perspective strategic culture might be located within the 
studies on political culture or treated as a narrower concept that explains only a part 
of state political culture, the one related to the use of force.  
Obviously both concepts – political culture and national character - have not been 
superseded by the strategic culture, but it is always the choice of the researcher which 
concept decides to use in his research.  
In the late 1970s, the term strategic culture was coined by Jack L. Snyder in his study of 
Soviet strategic culture. In his understanding, strategic culture is a certain mindset that 
a given community (elites of a state particularly) obtained from an existing set of rules, 
codes etc. (Snyder: 1977). His focus was on the use of a nuclear weapon by the Soviet 
Union against the West. He paid attention that combination of certain features of a 
given community may result in a specific outcomes that will be characterized only by 
that community: “(…)a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral patterns with 
regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them 
on the level of ‘culture’ rather than mere “policy”. New problems are not seen 
objectively. Rather they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the strategic 
culture” (Snyder: 1977 p. 8).  
It is important to note that later on Snyder had distanced himself from the concept of 
strategic culture. He contended that strategic culture can be applied only “when a 
distinctive approach to strategy becomes ingrained in training, institutions, and force 
postures”; when “strategic culture had taken on a life of its own, distinct from the 
social interests that helped give rise to it” (Snyder: 1990 in Uz Zaman: 2009, p. 76; see 
also Jacobsen: 1989).  
Snyder’s retreat did not discourage other authors to use strategic culture but most of 
them made reservations about the explanatory possibilities of the concept. For 
instance, commenting on Snyder’s work, Lantis (2002) highlighted his distinction that 
Soviet and American nuclear strategies are the outcomes of different historical, 
political and organizational, or even technological developments and circumstances.  
11 
 
Johnston (1995) has divided the scholars dealing with strategic culture into three 
generations and his proposal was further adopted by other authors (see for example 
Uz Zaman: 2009). According to this distinction, the first generation of scholars 
emerged, at the beginning of the 1980s and their starting point was Snyder’s research. 
The second generation came in the mid-1980s. Their approach was mostly based on a 
Gramscian understanding of political hegemony, while strategic culture was treated as 
a tool of it. Finally, the third generation appeared in the 1990s. The representatives of 
this generation tend to be more strict on the variables they take into account. Their 
innovation is also to exclude behavior while they define the notion of culture. 
According to Johnston, it is a remarkable step forward that helps to avoid a 
tautological trap that was a case for the first generation of scholars. The primary 
conclusion made by Johnston is that the first and third generations tend to treat 
“historically and culturally rooted notions about the ends and means of war” as 
limiting factors of strategic choices, while the second generation is opposed to that 
(Johnston: 1995, p. 43). The former approach requires that researcher’s focus is 
oriented on “how to isolate strategic cultural influences on behavior from the effects 
of other variables”. Whilst the latter entails the need to “look at how strategic culture 
is used to obscure or mask strategic choices that are made in the interests of domestic 
and international hegemons” (ibid.).  
However, Gray opposed the separation of strategic culture and behavior. In his 
opinion, strategic culture “surrounds and gives meaning to, strategic behavior, as the 
total warp and woof of matters strategic that are thoroughly woven together, or as 
both” (Gray: 1999, p. 50 quoted by Uz Zaman: 2009, p. 81). Commenting on it, Uz 
Zaman (2009) stated that strategic culture is, on the one hand, a “shaping context for 
behavior”. On the other hand, it is a “constituent of that behavior”. Whereas Kier 
(1995), recognizing the connection between culture and behavior, states that behavior 
does not affect the shaping of values leading to strategic choices, but affects the 
decisions of the government that lead to specific choices. 
12 
 
Most of the works from the first generation tend to treat strategic cultures as unique 
ones (e.g. Snyder’s work on Soviet strategic culture or Gray’s study on American one). 
A contrary point of view was expressed by Johnston (who logically should be classified 
as the representative of the third generation), who, while agreeing that there is an 
impact of strategic culture on state behavior, contends it is rather not “unique to any 
particular state” (Johnston: 1995, p. 33). Johnston also sees the advantage that the 
third generation prefers to focus on recent experience and practices that shape 
cultural values, while the first generation was oriented towards deeper historical 
research. In another place, he specifies that it is a strategic culture that equips in 
meaning “ahistorical or ‘objective variables such as technology, polarity, or relative 
material capabilities” (Johnston: 1995, p. 34).  
All this debate over the origin and applicability of strategic culture (including scientific 
dispute on it) has contributed to make strategic culture an established concept. It 
seems that, regardless of different theoretical approaches to strategic culture, the 
main expectation towards the concept remains the same – to find out why and how a 
political actor (state or as in the case of this study European Union) is willing to use 
armed forces that are at its disposal. 
Strategic culture -  in searching of theoretical and methodological foundations    
The lack of methodological and theoretical rigor has been repeatedly noted as the 
major challenge to develop the concept of strategic culture. However, it is already 
possible to track how the concept has evolved over time, what are the main trends in 
explaining the concept as well as methodological and theoretical approaches to 
strategic culture.  
Along with the growing popularity of the link between culture and state behavior 
among scholars, the scope of use the concept of strategic culture has been extended. 
While Snyder limited the application of strategic culture to the use of a nuclear 
weapon, the next generations of scholars begin to extend the application of concept 
on the use of force as such.  
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There is a visible tendency to put main importance on the role of the overall historical 
experience in early works on the strategic culture (Gray: 1984). The significance of the 
administrative and bureaucratic arrangements of a given country was more 
appreciated by later researchers (however, the importance of a state’s bureaucracy 
was already highlighted by Snyder in his article on Soviet strategic culture in 1977). In 
Snyder’s opinion, the patterns of behavior existing at the administrative level 
contribute to the development of a strategic culture: “It is enlightening to think of 
Soviet leaders not just as generic strategists who happen to be playing for the Red 
team, but as politicians and bureaucrats who have developed and been socialized into 
a strategic culture that is in many ways unique and who have exhibited distinctive 
stylistic predispositions in their past crisis behavior (Snyder: 1977, p. 9). This means 
that the attitude towards the use of force might be also analyzed at the lower levels 
than top political and military leadership. This might be a case especially for the EU 
that is governed on a different level as well as possesses own “bureaucratic mindset”.  
Moreover, devaluation of other than historical variables may be responsible for 
difficulties in conceptualizing strategic culture at the early stage of developing the 
concept. Concentrating on historical perspective exclusively covers the importance of 
other factors which in a given time period may have more significance than the 
experience gained in connection with the war or colonial past. In other words, paying 
attention to the existing mindset of the bureaucratic elite might occur particularly 
useful in the study of the EU’s strategic culture (Bulmer & Burch: 1998).  
While Snyder’s work on Soviet strategic culture remained a reference point for next 
generation of scholars, there are more attempts to define the concept. In the book 
“Asian Power and Politics”, Lucian W. Pye defined culture as “the dynamic vessel that 
holds and relativizes the collective memories of a people by giving emotional life to 
traditions” (Pye: 2009 quoted by Lantis: 2002, p. 104). In Lantis’s view, it is an 
understanding of strategic culture as a “generator” of preferences and values.  
For Stephen Rosen, strategic culture is the set of “beliefs and assumptions that frame 
(…) choices about international military behavior, particularly those concerning 
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decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of 
warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable” (Rosen:1996 
quoted by Lantis: 2002, p. 105).  
Alastair Johnston has proposed to define strategic culture as “an ideational milieu 
which limits behavior choices” (Johnston: 1995, p. 46). This milieu includes shared 
assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on an individual and 
group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political 
environment” (Johnston: 1995 quoted by Lantis: 2002, pp. 105-106). In addition, 
Johnston refers also to the anthropological studies on culture. As he states, his 
approach is based on the Clifford Geertz’s definition of religion as a cultural system 
(Geertz: 1973 in Johnston: 1995): “Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols 
(e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to 
establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of 
the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing 
these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic references seem 
uniquely realistic and efficacious” (Johnston: 1995, p. 46). approach.      
The approach of this study is built upon the primary findings of the third generation of 
scholars described by Johnston. With all respect to deep historical analysis that might 
shed additional light why certain cultural factors are rooted in a given society, this 
study implies the focus on recent events that are of crucial importance for shaping 
strategic culture.  
Current challenges and debates 
Among the works on strategic culture in the post-Cold War period, there are at least 
two repetitive threads. Firstly, that strategic culture and political culture more broadly 
are capacious concepts and deserves more attention from scholars (Duffield:2002; Uz 
Zaman: 2009). Secondly, that strategic culture lacks a solid theory and satisfactory 
methodological apparatus allowing to determine whether actually having a specific 
strategic culture determines the behavior of states against each other and anticipate 
their actions (Johnston:1995; see also Gray:1988). This means that the study on the EU 
15 
 
strategic culture requires good understanding how the concept was applied so far as 
well as propose a method that would be carefully shaped for the needs of applying this 
concept to the EU. This study will aim to address both these issues.  
In his article, Lantis indicated constructivism as of a great importance for the increase 
of interest in the influence of culture on the behavior of states. Alexander Wendt paid 
particular attention to the role of identities in shaping state interest. In his view, both 
interests and identities are “socially constructed by knowledgeable practice” (Wendt: 
1992). Whilst Valerie Hudson stated that constructivism “views culture as an evolving 
system of shared meaning that governs perceptions, communications, and actions (…) 
Culture shapes practice in both the short and long term. At the moment of action, 
culture provides the elements of grammar that define the situation, that reveal 
motives, and that set forth a strategy for success” (Hudson:1998, pp. 28-29 quoted by 
Lantis:2002). For his part, Johnston (1995) points out that for adherents of cultural 
approach can be difficult to explain similar strategic behavior, in regards to strategic 
cultures represented by different states. While structuralist may have a problem to 
deliver an explanation of different strategic culture when structural conditions are the 
same. Finally, according to Johnston, “strategic culture approach challenges the 
ahistorical, non-cultural neorealist framework for analyzing strategic choices” 
(Johnston: 1995, p. 35).  
According to Lantis, Katzenstein's book “The Culture of National Security” was the 
milestone in setting a new phase in scientific inquiry on strategic culture. It was an 
attempt to establish a link between theory and national security strategy by explaining 
“how norms, institutions, and other cultural features affect state interests and 
policies” (Lantis: 2002, p. 97).  
Finally, the authors focused on the concept of strategic culture after 1990 drew 
attention to various conditions that shape it. Some of them claim that the different 
attitude to use military comes from domestic political culture, which is by far more 
important than external conditions. Others wanted to explain how particular culture 
impacts that some military organizations choose certain types of strategies, 
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organizational solutions and exclude other. These authors, therefore, place much more 
emphasis on internal (or organizational) factors than on external ones (such as the 
location of a given country in the international system) in the process of shaping a 
given strategic culture (Uz Zaman: 2009; see also Kier: 1995; Legro: 1994; Farrel: 1998; 
Katzenstein,Okawara: 1993). 
This means that depending on the subject, there is the different focus of the sources of 
factors: If one is interested in the how strategic culture is formed one should look 
inside (e.g particular state). However, if the object of analysis is the EU strategic 
culture one should look at member state impact on EU strategic culture. 
Klein (1991) postulates to locate strategic culture within the theory of war. He does 
not treat strategic culture as a concept able to explain everything in an actor’s 
behavior but claims it might be useful when treated as a “tool” allowing to track subtle 
(nonvisible at first glance) aspects how different actors deal with the initially similar 
and objective conditions of functioning in the international sphere. This lowering of 
expectations in relation to what strategic culture can actually explain may prove to be 
useful in conceptualizing new methodological approach. Furthermore, Klein’s 
approach to strategic culture is much more related to the military leadership than a 
political one.  Therefore it does not come as a surprise that in his view strategic culture 
is “the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the 
political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of 
achieving it” (Klein:1991, p. 5). In another place, he explains his approach by 
identifying strategic culture as a framework for planning or preparation for war.  
The above overview indicates that there is no theoretical approach to the concept of 
strategic culture that would not rise controversies. Even though the strand of literature 
on the concept is already relatively rich, there are still voices about the validity of the 
very existence of this concept. One possible way to overcome this challenge is a trial to 
establish such a research method that could be also implemented in other cases, 
regarding the EU strategic culture. This study seeks for such an attempt. In order to 
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that, it is necessary to set the limits of application of this method, that will be indicated 
in the further section of this chapter.      
The bearers and sources of strategic culture 
The process of developing the concept of strategic culture goes obviously beyond 
formulating a satisfactory definition. Lantis (2002) has attempted to set in order the 
subjects who can make use of strategic culture as well as impact it. In his words, these 
subjects are the keepers of strategic culture.  
The first category of keepers is institutions. According to Duffield, they are able to 
shape policy by “organizational processes, routines, and standard operating 
procedures” which “constrain the types of information to which decision makers are 
exposed” (Duffield: 1998, p. 29 in Lantis: 2002).   
The second category of keepers of strategic culture is elites who make the decisions if 
certain cultural traditions should be kept in a given situation or to change current 
pattern of behavior concerning foreign policy (Lantis:2002). In such perspective, elites 
are also treated as “users of culture” who “redefine the limits of the possible” in key 
foreign and security policy discourses (Cruz: 2000 quoted by Lantis: 2002, p. 107). 
Arguably, here the elites can be understood as all leaders and political bodies that 
impact foreign policy. However, Jeffrey Legro specifies additionally that the 
organizational culture of the military leadership has an overpowering impact on 
security policy since “it tends to be isolated, highly regimented, and distinct” (Legro: 
1995 in Lantis: 2002). In the spirit of Snyder, the category of elites should be 
supplemented with middle and senior officials or bureaucracy as a set of certain norms 
of behavior. 
The third category of strategic culture beares is public opinion. Lantis (2002) describes 
its role as a part of the ideational milieu that impacts strategic culture and shapes 
broader “parameters of acceptable state behavior”. Even though, he concludes, that 
the overall role of public opinion is ambiguous and there are studies that suggest a 
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limited role of public opinion in shaping political decisions in regards to national 
security.  
In addition to the keepers of strategic culture, one can list the basic sources that 
appear in the literature. As Uz Zaman pointed out, the most important sources include: 
“geography; climate and natural resources; history and experience; political culture; 
the nature of organizations involved in defense; myths and symbols; key texts that 
inform actors of appropriate strategic action; and transnational norms; generational 
change and the role of technology” (Uz Zaman: 2009, p. 82). Some other authors 
include civil society and popular culture as one of the crucial factors in shaping 
strategic culture (Farrel: 2005 in Uz Zaman: 2009).  
For the study of the EU strategic culture, it implies that there is a necessity to look for 
all possible keepers and sources of strategic culture. This study assumes that EU 
institutions can be treated as bearers of strategic culture, while the role of member 
states is twofold: they can be conceptualized as a source of strategic culture but also 
as bearers as they can control strategic assets.  
Continuity and change 
Lantis’s article brings also an overview of the problem of continuity and change that is 
associated with strategic culture. On the one hand, it is highlighted that concepts such 
as strategic culture are susceptible to change. The process of gaining experience serves 
as a “filter for later learning that might occur” (Lantis:2002, p. 109). The logic behind 
accepting that strategic culture changes over time is based on the premise that 
historical experience, political institutions or international commitments result from 
the position of a given country in the world order and shape strategic culture. Thus, 
foreign policies built upon these elements are somehow by definition susceptible to 
change as well. The weakness of this standpoint, one may argue, is that it should be 
first confirmed what elements shape (or not) strategic culture.  
However, it should be noted that there are also important voices of criticism 
suggesting that strategic culture is rather a static concept. It comes from the conviction 
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that the focus on historical perspective makes the research that applies strategic 
culture highly predictive. Furthermore, skeptics highlight that strategic culture is 
dangerously close to being a tautology since it is difficult to separate dependent and 
independent variables in a convincing way. Therefore, this study makes it clear when it 
comes to variables and put the EU strategic culture as a dependent variable while the 
impact of a member state is an independent variable.  
Finally, the risk is also related to the fact that interpretations based on strategic culture 
are almost by definition unique, which, implicitly, causes a problem with repeatability 
of research and their reliability (Lantis: 2002). One possible answer to these arguments 
is to say that all of them stems from the lack of sound methodology and comparative 
studies which is also underlined by opponents of strategic culture approach. Therefore, 
more attention should be paid to develop a proper methodological apparatus to be 
applied in strategic cultural studies. This study is simply one of such attempts.  
Finally, there are also voices representing a middle way in regards to the problem of 
continuity and change of strategic culture. They generally agree that strategic culture 
can change, but it requires far-reaching and dramatic events that are serious enough 
to undermine the catalog of existing norms, rules, and values (Lantis: 2002).  
Snyder’s standpoint on the problem of continuity and change can be also ranked as an 
intermediate. His approach to strategic culture includes a glance at a given community 
as a whole as well as the role of individual units in the process of reproducing certain 
codes of behavior: “strategic cultures, like cultures in general, change as objective 
conditions change. But there is also a large residual degree of continuity. Individuals 
are socialized into a mode of strategic discourse and acquire a fund of strategic 
concepts that evolve only marginally over time” (Snyder: 1977, p. 11).  
By doing a research on Japanese and German antimilitaristic attitude, Lantis proposed 
two purposes of possible change of strategic culture. The first one is an “external 
shock” which cause a change of existing beliefs and patterns of behavior. In the case of 
Germany, according to Lantis, Kosovo crisis was such a shock that was powerful 
enough to undermine far-going pacifist attitude of German elites and made political 
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leaders reconsider the necessity of using military force in certain situations. The 
second one is the conflict between different strategic tenets that exist simultaneously 
and contradicts each other causing a strategic culture dilemma. According to Lantis, 
Japan suffered this kind of dilemma when faced the problem of East Timor struggling 
for its independence. The dilemma was based on the conflict of democratic standards 
of not using military force and a challenge to democracy that requires the use of force 
(Lantis: 2002). Arguably, different states may act differently in overcoming these 
dilemmas. Possible solutions include the attempts to redefine the catalog of values 
that built up one’s strategic culture, the change of international commitments of a 
state, or pursuing alternative diplomatic actions.  
Interestingly, Lantis does not identify strategic culture dilemmas as a failure. They are 
rather points of departure for a reconsideration of existing modes of behavior. The 
outcome of such reconsideration can be both: a maintaining status quo and setting the 
new path in regards to foreign policy (Lantis: 2002, p. 112).  
For the study focused on the EU strategic culture it helps to understand that the 
situation, in which strategic capabilities are still the characteristics of member states 
rather than EU institutions, does not evaluate itself the existence of the EU strategic 
culture. In addition, if any operation taken overseas by the EU is latter on assessed as a 
failure, it does not automatically means that there is no the EU strategic culture. As it 
was mentioned above, it should be rather treated as a dynamic concept (in the process 
of making) that is susceptible to both continuity and change.  
 
1.2 Strategic culture of the European Union 
The debate on the EU strategic culture overlap (at least partially) with the period of 
third generation authors working on the concept. Cornish and Edwards already in the 
early 2000s made an attempt to defined what EU strategic culture might be: “the 
institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of 
the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with 
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general recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military 
capabilities ((albeit limited; Cornish and Edwards: 2001, p. 587)).    
Sten Rynning brings an overview of opinions towards the EU strategic culture among 
scholars. The positive standpoint suggests that the EU is being equipped with 
necessary capabilities and political confidence to use force but still remains a civilian 
power. The negative standpoint argues that at the EU level there is no strategy and 
even policy since CSDP depends overwhelmingly on the member states (Rynning: 
2003; see also Heisbourg: 2000; Howorth: 2001; Lindey-French: 2002).     
The debate on the EU strategic culture is frequently put in the context of the missions 
or operations (mainly in Africa) that the EU was involved in (Haine: 2011; Biava, Drent, 
Herd: 2011). In such kind of analysis, the EU strategic culture is judged upon the 
success or failure of a given operation. It leads, however, to the unnecessary confusion 
of analysis fields. They are two different things: (1) readiness for use military potential 
and (2) the course of action with the use of armed forces on the ground. To use 
military genre, there might occur such circumstances on the battlefield which were 
unknown while the strategic culture was shaped. Therefore, both a success or a failure 
of the certain action (or battle) is not a success or failure of strategic culture. Strategic 
culture ends when the use of force really starts. In other words, strategic culture 
determines the attitudes toward (or lack thereof) of using force and only attitudes. It is 
not the same as the course of a given action or the tactics used during a military 
operation. 
Cornish and Edwards contribute to this point by suggesting that the EU strategic 
culture tends to be based not on defense (which is the key responsibility of NATO) but 
rather on making “difference in crises and conflicts” Cornish and Edwards: 2001, p. 
596). Besides all this, the EU is in a position of adapting to new security architecture in 
Europe that increases the possibility of developing the EU strategic culture (Cornish 
and Edwards: 2001). The link between member states and the EU institutions in 
regards to the strategic culture is rather commonly accepted by the authors. For 
instance, Per M. Norheim-Martinsen (2011) notices that the EU strategic culture is not 
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to replace the national one but to supplement it. So far, however, there was no 
analysis that would focus on the influence of particular member state on the EU 
strategic culture.  
An important thread in the study of the EU strategic culture is also a relation between 
the European Union and NATO. Cornsih and Edwards (2001) argue that on the one 
hand, it is necessary to define how the EU is going to use limited armed forces and the 
second part is to define why force would be used. For Cornish and Edwards, it 
correlates with political and military concepts that are formulated by nation states and 
NATO. According to them, the strategic culture of the EU is not the product of CSDP 
but it should be perceived as a mean “to start the process that will generate the 
political momentum to acquire capabilities (Cornish and Edwards: 2001, pp. 602-603).    
Rynning concludes also in support of the role of member states in developing the EU 
strategic culture: “The EU does not have the capacity to become a ‘liberal power’. 
Instead it must encourage coalitions driven by great powers to cultivate their own type 
of transnational strategic culture – coalitions that can be ephemeral or deeply 
institutionalized, depending on the political affinities of the involved countries – and 
then trust that these coalitions will be driven to respect EU rules and principles by the 
potential of EU structural power as well as the dynamics of an integrated armaments 
market” (Rynning: 2003). If Rynning’s way of thinking is correct, this is one more 
argument to study the impact of other actors (such as member states) on the EU 
strategic culture. In the end, it is member states that will build up these coalitions 
mentioned by Rynning as we can observe in recently established PESCO mechanism.  
Some scholars have already made an attempt to propose an analytical framework to 
study the EU strategic culture. It can be probably counted also as an answer to the 
existing need to develop methodological apparatus for the concept of strategic 
culture. Probably the most advanced trial in this regard is the research done by Alessia 
Biava, Margriet Drent and Graeme P. Herd (2001). Their analysis is based on the set of 
drivers of the EU’s strategic culture. This set includes: “the institutions, operations and 
strategic-level guidelines” (these express the purpose of strategic culture); “means and 
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goals of security policy” (these express the content of strategic culture); and “informal 
normative underpinnings” of such strategic culture (ibid: p. 1244). It might arguably 
conclude that the set of drivers comes directly from the strategic EU documents that 
authors analyzed in their article (starting from the early 1990s onwards).  
This study will follow a similar logic of checking the content of strategic EU documents. 
However, there will be a variable that was not taken into account in the above-
mentioned article – the role of a member state. It will thus supplement the findings of 
the drivers of the EU’s strategic culture by the knowledge how (by whom) these drivers 
were shaped, what is the potential source of these drivers. Only then one may draw 
further speculation about the development of the EU’s strategic culture.  
Summary of strategic culture 
The above brief overview of theoretical and methodological approaches toward 
strategic culture will serve as the basis for determining the analytical framework in the 
following parts of the paper. The theoretical assumptions are as follows:  
1. The approach of this study is built upon the primary findings of the third 
generation of scholars described by Johnston. It refers particularly to the separation of 
a cultural factor from behavior.  
2. With all respect to deep historical analysis that might shed additional light why 
certain cultural factors are rooted in a given society, this study implies the focus on 
recent events that are of crucial importance for shaping strategic culture.  
3. While most of the studies on strategic culture treat the concept as an 
independent variable, this study indicates it as a dependent variable. More specifically, 
the EU strategic culture is a dependent variable. Whereas the research question, the 
study aims to answer is how has the United Kingdom impacted on the European 
Union’s strategic culture? Moreover, this study makes particular effort to address the 
need for developing the methodological apparatus of strategic culture that will be 
discussed in the second chapter.  
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1.3 The concept of Europeanization 
 
To answer the research question of this study it is necessary to clarify mechanisms of 
how the Member States affect the strategic culture of the European Union. The 
concept of Europeanization will be particularly useful to address this need.  
In the broader sense, the term “Europeanization” is sometimes conceptualized as a 
result of a development of a common European culture (Schmale: 2010). While the 
concept of Europeanization has its significant strand of literature related to the process 
of European integration (see for instance Olsen: 2002), there is also a literature 
presenting a non-EU-centric approach to the concept (Borneman and Fowler: 1997; 
Flockhart: 2010). However, the literature on Europeanization has been growing 
extensively at least from the beginning of the 1990s and this strand of literature is of 
main importance in this study.  
Theoretically, Europeanization draws on various approaches such as 
(neo)functionalism or inter-governmental. A comprehensive discussion of this concept 
can be found, for example in the works of Tanja Börzel (2002; 2012; see also Börzel 
and Risse: 200 and 2012). In one of her article, she has provided the analysis of the 
“domestic impact of Europe” seen from different perspectives. It can be 
conceptualized as a process of institutional adaptation; redistribution of resources, or 
process of socialization. Depending on the approach taken, the outcomes of domestic 
change differ (Börzel: 2003).  
One of the commonly known definitions of the Europeanization is the one proposed by 
Claudio Radaelli: “Europeanization consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion 
and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first consolidated 
in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and 
sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli: 2004, p. 5). 
The advantage of this kind of definition is that it refers to material and non-material 
elements that can be Europeanized. Similar elements appear also when we talk about 
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the concept of strategic culture. On the other hand, this definition suggests that the 
process of Europeanization is somehow unidirectional (from the EU to the member 
states). While this study adopts a reverse direction: from a member state to the EU 
level. Therefore in the next section, there will be discussed also a process how the 
member states can transfer their ‘ways of doing things’ on the supranational agenda.  
Top-down vs. bottom-up logic 
The main difference between top-down Europeanization (downloading) and bottom-
up Europeanization (uploading) comes to answer the question who influences whom. 
The first category refers to the situation in which the European Union “affects” other 
actors such as the member states (see Olson: 2002).  The EU may affect the Member 
States in different ways. Knill and Lehkmkuhl (2002) has distinguished 1) “positive 
integration” that refers to standards created by the EU and adopted by member 
states; 2) “negative integration” that is about eliminating internal barriers in the 
Member States, e.g. for the development of policies related to the flow of goods, 
persons, and capital; and 3) “framing domestic believes and expectations which is 
about promoting, for instance, the EU values or certain policies indirectly, e.g. by 
making changes in the opinion of addressees in a cognitive sense (Knill and Lehkmkuhl: 
2002 in Filipec: 2017).  
The second category – uploading – includes, on the one hand, all measures that are 
taken by the EU member states to affect the EU policies according to their needs. All 
these practices are frequently described as the bottom-up model of Europeanization 
(Börzel: 2003).  In practice, both dimensions of Europeanization are “active” 
simultaneously, while for this study uploading is of critical importance.  
While discussing the issue of uploading, Börzel underlines the role of national 
governments in the “ascending” (policy formulation decision making) and 
“descending” (implementation) stage of the European policy process” (Börzel: 2003, p. 
19). According to her, the national executives occupy a crucial position in both “the 
decision-making and the implementation of European policies and thus influence the 
way in which member states shape policies and institutions and adapt to (ibid.). 
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Arguably, it is the case for such policy areas as foreign and security issues that still 
remain under the strict control of member states. Therefore, it has also its significance 
in formulating the EU strategic culture.  
Member States can also delegate national competencies at the EU level as well as 
influence the process of building supranational institutions (Schmidt: 2001; Hix and 
Goetz: 2000). All these aspects play a role when it comes to equipping the EU in 
military capabilities that are of critical importance for strategic culture.  
How member states shape strategic culture at the EU level 
Before the answer to the question of this section will be given, it is worthy to consider 
also what exactly can by ‘uploaded’ by the member states as well as other actors at 
the EU level, according to existing literature. 
In the study of bottom-up Europeanization of social movements in France, McCauley 
proved that this concept can be successfully adapted also to non-state actors 
(McCauley: 2011). From the perspective of this study, even more, important is that he 
proved that the subject of uploading can be a certain ‘way of thinking’ or a postulate of 
a certain policy even if in advance it is certain that it will not be automatically a part of, 
for instance, existing European law. In other words, uploading has its important variant 
in advocating certain issues or policies or socially relevant problems.  
In regards to the EU member states, Tanja Börzel argues that policy preferences and 
action capacity are two decisive factors for choosing the strategy based on 
‘downloading’ or ‘uploading’: policy preferences and action capacity (Börzel: 2002, 
p.208). According to her, the countries with a stronger economic capacity may tend to 
choose a role of policy-makers in which uploading is a more likely strategy to be 
chosen. From the perspective of this research, her findings might serve as an 
additional explanation why the UK would be interested in uploading the elements of 
components of own strategic culture at the EU level.   
According to Börzel, member states may shape “European policies, institutions, and 
processes to which they have to adapt later (Börzel: 2003, p. 19). Practically, both 
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uploading and downloading exist simultaneously, contributing to the interplay 
between the EU and member states (ibid.). While more recent studies suggest that 
there are no limits in terms of what kind of domestic policies can be Europeanized; 
rather all types of policies are susceptible to Europeanization (Graziano and Vink: 
2013). In other words, there is no convincing argument in the literature to reject the 
idea of Europeanized strategic culture.  
One more aspect related to uploading is the question why member states could be 
interested in uploading. Börzel brings the argument that making European policy 
similar to domestic one result in lower costs of adaptation and implementation 
process (ibid.).  
Börzel argues that at the national level, different actors put pressure on the national 
executives to promote such policies at the EU level that are in favor of their interests. 
While at the EU level, the national governments try to pursue such policies that in 
result will satisfy domestic pressure (Börzel: 2003). It is a promising premise explaining 
why a member state would be interested in transferring own attitude toward strategic 
culture at the EU level. As it was discussed in previous sections, strategic culture has 
multiple sources. It results in that different domestic actors, as well as non-material 
factors, built up the pressure on the national government to fulfill expectations related 
to defense objectives. Thus, a national executive might be interested in meeting this 
expectation by addressing them at the EU level (when meeting them is not possible 
alone) or creating such international security architecture that would serve its own 
interests and low pressure at domestic level.      
One of the relatively recent attempts to address this issue is the working paper by 
Müller and de Flers (2009). The authors point out that the outcome of up-loading is 
“the projection of national foreign policy preferences (ideas and policy templates) onto 
the EU level” (Müller and de Flers: 2009, p. 10). It can work especially when the 
Member States assume that there is no other way to achieve their foreign policy goals 
than bringing it to the EU level. Another motivation to shift towards EU level can be a 
reducing a risk and costs of implementation of controversial policy (e.g. sanctions) in 
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unilateral mode. According to those authors, uploading “ideally results in other 
Member States’ adoption of the projected policies. However, several Member States 
will often inject their preferences into EU-level negotiations (ibid.). For the process of 
developing the EU strategic culture, it shows what can be the motivation of a member 
state to “act” at the EU level. Is such action is present, then we can start to talk about 
how a given member of the Union shapes the strategic culture at the EU level.  
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Part II.  Methodology  
 
2.1 Research design 
The research design adopted in the study is the Disciplined Interpretive Case Study 
(Odell: 2001). According to Odell, this type of research design is applied when the 
formulation of a new theory extends the framework of a study, but it pretends to 
contribute to the existing theory. It corresponds to the approach of this study while it 
is built on the attempt to address the existing lacks in the examined phenomenon. In 
this case, it is lack of solid methodological approach to studying strategic culture while 
the understanding of the concept itself is built on the findings of other authors.  
While one part of the study is a comparison of the content of the EU strategic 
documents to the attitude towards strategic culture expressed by the UK’s political 
leaders, the main strand of analysis concerns particularly how one member state has 
shaped the EU strategic culture. Therefore, the analysis does not provide a comparatist 
insight of the role of different factors contributing to the UK’s strategic culture. The 
British attitude to the use of force is presented as certain aggregate without providing 
in-depth historical analysis of motivations or processes that made up the UK’s strategic 
culture. Finally, this study does not include the role of any other member state in 
shaping the EU strategic culture. These are the arguments for choosing this type of 
research design. It implies, that the possible result of the study might be a partial 
answer to the question what is the EU strategic culture by knowing how it is being 
developed. The value of the study lies in the rising awareness of how one of the 
sources of EU strategic culture (member state) shapes its strategic culture. In addition, 
this study attempts to propose a method to study EU strategic culture that (if confirms 
its reliability and validity) could be implemented to study the role of other member 
states in shaping the EU strategic culture and perhaps – in longer-perspective – 
conduct a comparative study of cases analyzed by the same method.  
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2.2 Case selection 
The reasons why the United Kingdom was selected as a case country in this research 
are as follows:  
1. It is one of the most powerful member states in the European Union that 
possesses the capacity for uploading own agenda at the EU level. Moreover, as 
an actor acting at the global level, the UK has a vital interest in shaping the 
security and defense architecture in Europe. In consequence, the UK uses 
possible ways of achieving its goals and at least part of them might be fulfilled 
at the EU level.  
 
2. The UK has been for years actively participated in the European discussion on 
security agenda. If the planned assumption of the influential role of the UK in 
shaping the EU strategic culture is correct, then it is necessary to know how this 
strategic culture might evolve after Brexit. However, before making conclusions 
about this evolution one should know what was (or still is) the factual impact of 
the UK on the EU strategic culture. 
 
3. The position of the UK in the international world order causes that the UK 
possesses its own strategic culture (see for instance: Macmillan: 1995; 
Miskimmon: 2004; Carr and Tomkins: 1998; the UK strategic culture will be 
discussed more broadly in the third part of the thesis). It makes then possible 
to establish a link between national strategic culture and the one that is to be 
transferred at the EU level.  
 
4. Access to data. The UK provides a convenient access to the debate on ongoing 
political issues (including foreign and defense issues). Particularly the database 
of the British parliament allows following the standpoint of the British 
government on domestic and foreign affairs at least from the beginning of the 
1990s. It has fundamental importance for the analysis how the UK has been 
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shaping the EU strategic culture since it makes possible to have a look at the UK 
positions quickly before or just in the moments (‘defining moments’) which 
were crucial for designing the EU strategic culture. It will show thus the UK 
attitude towards European grant strategy without the necessity of conducting a 
deep historical analysis of all elements making of the UK strategic culture. 
 
2.3 Method   
Process tracing is a method applied in the study. It is a well-recognized analytical tool 
of qualitative analysis in social sciences (Vennesson: 2008). Adherents of this method 
underline that it successfully combines description with causal interference and well-
grounded description (even if remains static) which is an essential basis of further 
analysis of the sequence of events (Collier: 2011).  
Process tracing allows catching a change since it focuses on the events happening over 
time instead of changes at one point. Such methodological perspective corresponds to 
my general theoretical assumption that any analysis of the EU strategic culture which 
considers the role of a member state must be based on sound investigation how this 
influence has occurred and evolved over time.  
In Collier’s view, process tracing is “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence 
selected and analyzed in the light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the 
investigation”. As a part of the further explanation, he complements that process 
tracing is “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from 
diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence of 
events or phenomena” (Collier: 2011, pp. 823-824). The systematic examination of this 
study will be based on the selected events that are to show how the EU strategic 
culture has evolved over a certain period of time (with the reservation that only one 
factor in shaping the EU's strategic culture is taken into account - the role of a member 
state). These events are of the same nature (EU strategic documents; described 
broader in the next section) that should increase the coherence of the study. Thus, the 
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result will be both (1) descriptive as the context of the selected event will be part of 
the analysis as well as (2) causal inferences as on the basis of description and data 
analysis there will be possible to draw conclusions how the examined phenomenon 
(strategic culture) has been shaped which is thought – in this study - as a step forward 
to better understanding of the EU strategic culture.  
In the literature on process tracing there is a visible agreement on the fact that process 
tracing might be used when the cause and outcome are generally known. The 
knowledge about them might be of the general character or drawing from the 
literature (e.g. other studies in the given (Mahoney: 2012; Keating & della Porta: 
2008).  
In this study, the outcome is the EU strategic culture (dependent variable) at the 
current stage of development characterized by a certain set of indicators. The cause is 
the impact of the member state (the UK in this case). The knowledge about the impact 
of the UK on the EU strategic culture will come from the analysis in the last part of the 
thesis. The literature on the subject is a secondary source of knowledge that brings an 
understanding of the key concepts in the study.  
Process tracing requires also conducting a certain test for hypothesis (or even a set of 
different tests). One type of the test indicates to show a factor (X) that causes the 
outcome (Y). In between, there is also a mechanism (M) that is impacted by factor X. 
The logic behind this test is to show how the factor X impacts the mechanism M. If M 
has an impact on Y then it is logical that X causes Y.  
The cause X in this research is the UK that shapes the EU strategic documents 
regarding the use of force. While uploading is the mechanism “M” that makes this 
impact possible. Strategic culture of the European Union is an outcome Y. Therefore, if 
it is possible to show that the UK shapes the process of Europeanization of certain 
rules and standards or way of understanding the use of force then one can make a 
conclusion that the cause X impacts M it also impacts Y. 
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Process tracing will be complemented by the document analysis – regarding an 
analysis of the documents reflecting British position to the EU’s formulation of grand 
strategy. Whilst content analysis will be applied to investigate selected documents on 
the British strategic culture as well as the EU’s strategic documents.  
This study expects to see either the confirmation of stated hypothesis or rejection of 
the hypothesis. In the case of rejection, there is an expectation to see enough 
prerequisites to make additional tests. In other words, an acceptable result of the test 
might be that the cause is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for the causal inferior 
(the terminology adopted from Collier: 2011).  
 
Graph 1. The defining moments of the European Union Strategic Culture 
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2.4 Timeframe  
The general timeframe of the study is 1990-2016. Starting date marks the beginning of 
the Maastricht Treaty negotiations and emerging a new phase of discussion on the 
EU’s foreign and defense policy among member states. The closing date marks the 
time when the result of Brexit referendum was known and the first attempts to 
reformulate EU’s global role were formulated.   
However, process tracing requires also picking some specific defining moments in 
which the actual measurement is done. In this study, these defining moments are 
Maastricht Treaty; the European Defense Strategic of 2003 and a Global Strategy for 
the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016. In each of this moment, it will be compared 
what elements of British strategic thinking are reflected at the EU level and the scope 
to which the United Kingdom has affected the EU strategic culture. Having done such 
analysis, the study will make an answer to the research question and try to indicate to 
what extent the UK’s influence on the EU strategic culture is of constant character.  
 
2.5 Sources 
The impact of the United Kingdom on the EU’s strategic culture will be tracked in the 
following sources:  
1. Archives from the UK parliament (Commons Hansard). The online database 
(primary source).  
2. Official statements of British officials – on the EU’s foreign and defense policy 
(supplementary source) 
3. Strategic documents of the United Kingdom (supplementary source) 
The selection of sources is motivated by the will to catch the moment in which the 
elements of the UK strategic culture are presented (even if it is not a fully cautious 
expression). What is more, parliamentary debates give an opportunity to look how the 
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UK strategic culture is understood by different political actors (e.g. the government 
and the opposition politicians).  
 
2.6 Operationalization of independent and dependent variables 
During the analysis, some quotations from the sources will be presented. This is done 
to secure the possibility to judge independently whether a given source allows drawing 
the proposed inference. In addition, the aim is to make the data available and useful 
for other studies. Each source quoted will be marked by the exact date and the 
headline that will make easier access to anyone interested in searching the Commons 
Hansard in future in regards to the topic discussed in this study.  These findings will be 
complemented by the literature review on the British strategic culture as well as 
British impact on EU treaties (see for instance A. Forster: 1998). 
In the second part of the analysis, a defined British approach will be subsequently 
compared with the EU documents and official statements and documents which reflect 
EU’s strategic thinking. The list of documents includes Maastricht Treaty – regarding 
the Second Pillar, European Defense Strategic of 2003, A Global Strategy for the EU’s 
Foreign and Security Policy 2016. The second part of the analysis will be devoted to the 
analysis of the extent of the UK’s components of national strategic culture are (or not) 
reflected at the EU level. It should reveal some features of the EU strategic culture. The 
expectation is to see to what extent the EU strategic culture was/is susceptible to the 
impact of the chosen member state. For the clarity of the inference, the 
comprehensive and final discussion of the dependent variable will be put in the last 
part of the entire study. It will be complemented by the speculation and 
recommendations about the possible directions for further studies of the EU strategic 
culture.      
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Part III. The United Kingdom’s impact on the EU strategic culture 
 
1.1  The United Kingdom’s approach to strategic culture 
 
This section is intended to clarify what exactly is an object of analysis. It is worthy to 
start with the repetition of the aim the whole study – to explain how the European 
Union strategic culture was shaped by the United Kingdom. ”How” is understood here 
twofold. Firstly, the analysis should show what elements of UK’s strategic thinking can 
be found at the EU level (in the EU’s strategic documents). Secondly, how (by using 
what mechanism) these elements have been transferred at the EU level. This 
paragraph focuses on explaining the first understanding of “how” question of the 
study. In the end, this section aims to indicate what elements of the UK’s strategic 
culture are expected to be present in the EU’s strategic culture.  
 
A caveat necessary to introduce at this point is that this study does not aspire to 
provide an in-depth discussion on the origin of the United Kingdom strategic culture. It 
is a synthesis of the most frequent threads that appear in the literature of the subject. 
Besides the argument of conciseness, such choice is also motivated by the fact that the 
empirical material is primarily the records of the parliamentary debates in the UK. 
Therefore, the study makes an assumption that the positions of the politicians 
expressed during the debates are already a synthesis of different factors that construct 
a given attitude towards the use of force. In other words, the main focus is put on 
what was said during debates not why.  
 
In addition, this study focuses only on the key elements of the UK’s strategic culture. 
These elements are significant enough to contribute to engaging politicians in the 
action aimed at securing a certain set of interests at the EU level. Again, having the 
complete image of the UK’s strategic culture is sacrificed for the clarity and 
conciseness of the study and not losing the dependent variable as the central point of 
analysis.  
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As it was outlined in the first chapter of the study, the concept of strategic culture 
shares some similarities with other concepts or has its origins in broader concepts such 
as political culture or national style. Therefore, it has own importance to have a look 
on the literature on the British strategic culture as well as these concepts that are close 
to it and are intended to explain the similar phenomenon which is the attitude to use 
of force.  
 
One of the examples giving a valuable and initial insight on the British strategic 
thinking is an analysis of nation-state identities done by Marcusen, Risse, Engelmann-
Martin, Knopf, and Rosher (1999). Similarly to this study, their study focuses on the 
elite’s attitude but towards European integration in general. According to the authors, 
there has been practically no major change regarding the UK’s position towards 
European integration within the British elites since the end of the Second World War. 
While after the Cold War the UK’s attitude towards Europe is defined by the opposing 
to the further Europeanization. The authors make also an interesting argument that 
this specific social construction of being different to continental Europe is strongly 
linked to the institutions which have become also a “bearers” of a certain 
understanding of national sovereignty. Therefore – according to the authors – it should 
not be a surprise that the UK prioritizes an intergovernmental approach to the 
European integration that equipped member states with key importance in bargaining 
the shape of the European Union (details in Marcusen, Risse, Engelmann-Martin, 
Knopf, and Rosher: 1999, pp. 625-630).  
 
The above-mentioned study on the nation-state identities shows already the great 
significance of continuity in designing politics towards Europe by the UK’s politicians. It 
carries also an importance for the study of strategic culture. While for some European 
states the end of cold war has brought a fundamental change in “thinking of” strategic 
culture, for the UK it could be less significant that required securing the same set of 
interests by using new types of emerging European mechanisms such like Maastricht 
Treaty.  
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Among the works devoted specifically to the UK’ strategic culture, there are some 
elements of the UK’s strategic culture after the Cold War which is attached with crucial 
significance:  
1. Balancing Europeanist and Atlanticist vision of foreign policy – it refers to the 
special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. This 
element of the UK’s strategic culture had played a great role during the Cold 
War and remained important also afterward since the UK maintained its role of 
mediator between the US and Europe in security matters (Van Evera: 1990). 
Miskimmon (2004, p. 280) argues additionally that the relationship between 
British and the US defense structures is a “central pillar of the UK’s strategic 
culture”. The core meaning of this element in this study is confined to the role 
the UK assigns to NATO. In this perspective, NATO should remain the 
fundament of the European security architecture. The EU’s role is only to 
supplement the Alliance and in no case to replace it.  
2.  Great power legacy – this element refers to a certain mindset that British 
decision-makers inherited from the imperial past.  However, in the 
contemporary context, this element is not about an imperial approach to 
foreign policy but about willingness to maintain privileged status of global 
power and keeping other state distanced from that status (Macmillan: 1995).  
3. Evolutionary change – marks the attitude that prioritizes gradual change in the 
field of defense policy and avoids sharp, unexpected decisions that may lead to 
the effects that are difficult to predict and manage. This element also 
underlines the great role of continuity in British politics. While some authors 
(see for instance Jessop: 1971) link it with such categories as civility and 
traditionalism, others put it directly to the field of defense issues (Macmillan: 
1995). The significance of this element lies in the preference of keeping status 
quo in regards to the European defense set-up that allows minor changes 
instead of significant re-design. While Macmillan has distinguished British 
political culture and the nature of decision-making process as two separate 
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elements of the UK’s strategic culture (where preference of evolutionary 
change is a part of British political culture) this study prefers to use more 
precise category than a political culture which is by definition broad. In fact, in 
Macmillan analysis, the preference of evolutionary change is the main 
characteristic of British political culture. This study assumes that the category 
of evolutionary change has more precise meaning and thus is less vague.   
4. Multilateralism – it is traditionally linked with the British dilemma of securing 
the position of a sea power with the ability to maintain continental 
commitment. To address this dilemma, the UK had attempted repeatedly to 
keep own status of sea power and to keep continental Europe diverse in terms 
of power centers – to avoid a situation in which one European state is powerful 
enough to threaten the UK’s position (Freedman: 1995). In the European 
Union’s context, this element is confined rather to the preference of avoiding 
such constructs as “German Europe” or “French Europe”. 
 
Graph 2. The key components of the United Kingdom’s strategic culture 
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All the elements discussed above are closely interlinked and in this study contribute to 
the overall image of the UK’s strategic culture. One may reasonably point out that 
Balancing Europeanist and Atlanticist vision of foreign policy is a crucial condition for 
the preference of evolutionary change (since the security architecture based on NATO 
is simply beneficial for the United Kingdom). Also, great power legacy and 
multilateralism are closely linked with each other since it was UK’s global status that 
allowed to keep own influence on the European continent.  
It has its significance for the further analysis in this study. It might be sometimes 
difficult to indicate precise moment in which one of another element of the UK’s 
strategic culture is reflected in the EU’s strategic documents. Therefore, the analysis 
will be cautious when it comes to suggesting there is a direct impact on the UK on the 
EU strategic culture. However, the analysis will seek for the direct evidence such as 
institutional arrangements that were postulated by British politicians as well as the 
overall ”spirit” of the EU’s strategic culture will be assessed in terms of its closeness or 
distance to the one of the UK. Therefore, the presence of each element of the UK’s 
strategic culture at the EU level will be assessed separately and the results of the 
analysis may range from more precise to less palpable. It will finally affect the 
verification of the study’s hypothesis.  
 
1.2   Case 1 of ‘uploading’: Maastricht Treaty 
 
The Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union, TEU) was selected as a “defining 
moment” in this study since it is the document that still is a fundament of the 
European Union’s security arrangement. In this document, security and defense issues 
agreed in the separate Chapter, well-known as a Second Pillar (the three-pillar division 
was finally waived by the Lisbon Treaty, hoverer, it did not invalidate the Maastricht’s 
provisions in the field of security and defense).  
The international context in which TEU had taken place is also worthy to mention. 
Shortly after the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, the discussion 
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on the redefinition of security issues in Europe had to be expected. The engagement of 
the United Kingdom in this discussion could result of her status within the European 
Union as well as the role in the world order (strengthened by the special relationship 
with the United States and permanent membership in the UN Security Council. 
Furthermore, according to some research, British government considered the 
possibility of withdrawing its strong engagement in NATO for the sake of strengthening 
European integration in which Germany and France, arguably, could be a major 
beneficiary (Forster: 1998; see also Baker: 1989; Coker: 1992). In other words, there 
was an international pressure that British government could feel. In addition, this 
study expects to see that the government was subjected to pressure also from British 
politicians. This combination of external and internal factors should lead finally to the 
situation in which the government was trying to secure its interests related to the use 
of force at the EU level.  
Empirical analysis  
The document analysis of the primary source indicates that an issue of common 
European defense was an object of political debate in the UK’s parliament at least 
from the turn of 1990 and 1991. It was already in January 1991 Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs addressed the issue of the greater involvement of 
European allies in NATO:  
The NATO ministerial meeting in December agreed that the European allies should take 
a greater role. For NATO, the Western European Union and the intergovernmental 
conference of the Twelve on political union, discussion of European defense will be a 
key task for this year (…)There are no plans to transfer our basic guarantees of security 
from NATO to anywhere else (House of Commons: January 16, 1991; all excerpts come 
from the online database of the British Parliament, search by date, section 1988-
20161) 
                                                          
1 https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/  
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It is worthy to note that whenever the issues related to security, defense, and the use 
of force in the European context were discussed in the UK’s Parliament, there was no 
question for British politicians such like if UK should be engaged in creating the EU’s 
security architecture. There was only question how the UK decision-makers are going 
to be involved (implicitly how they want to secure UK’s security objectives). Therefore, 
it may serve as evidence that there was a common political expectation toward UK’s 
government to act at the EU level. In other words, there was significant domestic 
pressure on the government which is one of the preconditions necessary for 
uploading. 
As predicted, the role of NATO, including the military presence of the United States in 
Europe, was ascribed with high importance and the UK’s government clearly stated 
that it is a fundament of the collective security in Europe:  
NATO, including the presence of north American forces in Europe, remains the basis for 
our collective security. The alliance is adapting to the new circumstances in Europe and 
we have put forward proposals for strengthening the European pillar within the 
alliance by building up the Western European Union. The WEU has shown that it can 
play a useful role in co-ordinating European military activities outside Europe (House of 
Commons: February 13, 1991). (…) 
So far as we and most members of the Community are concerned, there is no question 
of trying to load on to the EC the responsibility for our defence that is shouldered by 
NATO. There is a question of how far we can build up the WEU, as my hon. Friend 
knows and approves, but the essence of our defence will continue to lie in the Atlantic 
alliance (ibid.) 
The necessity to be engaged in the treaty negotiations was not questioned. British 
decision-makers were determined to promote own vision of the future security 
arrangements and the possibility to use negotiations to achieve that is rather clearly 
visible. In addition, the UK put emphasis on intergovernmental bargaining:  
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(…)We want to improve foreign policy co-ordination, but the basis of our security in 
Europe must continue to be the Atlantic alliance. In order to allow European co- 
operation to prosper, we need a flexible treaty structure distinguishing between 
Community and intergovernmental activity (House of Commons: June 27th, 1991) 
The process of constructing new security architecture was influenced by the UK at 
different levels. Postulates regarding the defense of the future European Union 
(boiling down to complementing NATO's role rather than replacing it) was 
complemented by the process of influencing the transformation of NATO itself, by 
advocating the need to maintain US troops in Europe. In addition, the UK was able to 
build a temporary coalition with other members of European Communities (Italy in this 
case) that were ready to share UK’s vision of defense capabilities of the future 
European Union. It shows the spectrum of measures that were at the UK’s disposal to 
achieve strategic objectives as well as a determination to secure them:  
(…) but we do not believe that, as a result of the Maastricht discussions, the 
Community should resolve itself into a defence Community. Our proposals, particularly 
in the Anglo-Italian paper on strengthening the Western European Union, are designed 
to deal with that point (…) Friend the Prime Minister will go to the NATO summit in 
Rome. NATO is completing the present phase of its transformation, which was 
launched at the summit in London in July last year. It is absolutely right that Europe 
should take a proportionately greater share of the effort in its own defences. That is the 
thinking behind the Anglo- Italian proposals which I mentioned. However, we are clear 
that it is neither wise nor safe to make or suggest arrangements within the European 
12 which duplicate or undermine NATO (…) The principles behind the Anglo-Italian 
paper, (…) are that any reference to a European defence identity or a European defence 
policy needs to be married absolutely to the Atlantic alliance (House of Commons 
November: 1st, 1991).  
In the multithreaded speech in front of the House of Commons in November 1991, 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs also referred to the issue of 
whether after the end of the Cold War, organizations such as NATO became 
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unnecessary. His answer reveals the way of British thinking about changes in the field 
of defense, which inclines to the evolutionary implementation of changes instead of 
wholesome transformations. This is a clear demonstration of the element of British 
thinking about strategic culture, discussed in the first part of this chapter:  
Europe is vulnerable to all kinds of uncertainties and instabilities. We have talked about 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. No one can be sure about what will come out of 
that. Looking at the Middle East or at north Africa, no one can be sure what threats 
that have not yet been clearly identified may emerge. To say that we should dismantle 
our security organisation and say goodbye to the Americans and Canadians is simply to 
fly in the face of history. The same mistake was made in the early 1920s (Ibid.) 
When the process of reforming NATO (in the light of the Rome summit in late 1991) 
and establishing the shape of a new treaty on the European Union were already 
advanced, British politicians began to express the opinion that strategic decisions 
regarding a new framework for cooperation in the field of defense and security in 
Europe are in line with British expectations:  
The NATO summit also, for the first time, considered in depth the European defence 
identity and the alliance. We affirmed some important principles : first, the principle 
that NATO is the essential forum for consultation and agreement on policies bearing on 
the security and defence of alliance territory ; secondly, endorsement of the British 
proposals to use the Western European Union as the means of strengthening the 
European pillar of the alliance ; thirdly, the need to establish clear and open relations 
between NATO and the Western European Union and to involve other allies on issues 
discussed in the Western European Union which affect their security. (ibid.) 
Forsters (1998) argues that the process of strengthening British vision of the use of 
force by the European Union and weakening the French vision of strengthening 
Europe's defense capabilities at the expense of NATO was done by securing the 
creation of Alliance Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) under permanent British Command.  
45 
 
The satisfaction with the overall shape of the Maastricht Treaty was expressed by the 
Prime Minister, John Major in November 1993. He pointed out the role of national 
governments in the European Union, which has its significant importance on how the 
EU’s strategic culture is to be developed in future:  
Britain successfully used the Maastricht negotiations to reassert the authority of 
national governments. It is clear now that Community will remain a union of sovereign 
national states (J. Major in the Economist: 1993, p. 27). 
Such institutional setup (started in Maastricht) has laid down the basis for further 
development of the EU's strategic culture. In the next section, it will be discussed what 
elements exactly of the British strategic culture were uploaded at the EU level at that 
time.  
The content of Maastricht Treaty 
A look into the concluded text of the Treaty on the European Union shows that one of 
the key elements of the UK’s strategic culture is reflected at the EU level in a way that 
can be described as a direct impact. It is the balancing Europeanist and Atlanticist 
vision of foreign policy. As the paragraph J.4 of TEU states: 
The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect 
the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be 
compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that 
framework (TEU: 1993, Title V, J.4) 
Also, a declaration on the Western European Union (WEU) attached to the TEU 
specifies the link between WEU, the EU, and NATO that is close to British vision of 
security architecture in Europe:  
(…) The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defense component of the 
European Union (…) the objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further 
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the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, 
responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance (TEU, 
Declaration on Western European Union, pp. 243-244). 
Other elements of the British strategic culture are not reflected in such a direct way. 
This is due to the character of TEU itself. It comprises rather general provisions that 
indicate the overall institutional shape of the European Union. There is no room for 
outlining a specific and detailed vision of the foreign policy and the use of force. One 
may also argue that the elements of British strategic culture are interlinked to each 
other. From this perspective, securing the engagement of the US military role after the 
cold war appeared as the most important part of negotiation package for the UK. Once 
achieved, the other elements are also present at least partially.  
It is important to note, that the object of uploading is not just one or another specific 
provision in TEU. In fact, the UK has uploaded a certain vision of foreign and defense 
policy that includes also the use of force. This vision is based primarily on NATO as the 
only international and collective subject allowed exercising force. Since that moment, 
this arrangement has been the constant factor influencing the development of the 
EU’s strategic culture. Furthermore, the significant geopolitical change that occurred in 
Europe in the beginnings of the 1990s, could lead to major shifts in the field of 
security. In fact, alternative scenarios were also discussed but they did not reach 
enough support. The fact that Europe has chosen finally the way of gradually adapting 
to the new geopolitical situation, based on the same institution - US-led NATO - 
resonates additionally with the British approach to changes in foreign and defense 
policy which favors evolutionary change instead of revolutionary.  
It cannot be unambiguously rejected that without the UK, similar provisions in the TEU 
would not have been agreed. However, as the document analysis has shown, it was 
the UK who was strongly advocating this set of arrangements and this issue was on the 
British political agenda at that time. One may oppose that the international context 
favored Britain in achieving its goals since after the cold war, the United States was 
indisputable leader in global politics and it could be somehow natural that Europe 
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would like to base own security on further close cooperation with the United States 
through a reformed NATO. On the other hand, however, it might be stated that the UK 
has used all means that possessed to secure own interests and transfer own strategic 
thinking at the EU level.  
Regarding the research design of the study, some conclusions can be drawn from the 
case of TEU. Firstly, the mechanism introduced by process tracing – uploading – has 
occurred. There were enough domestic evidence to state that the UK government was 
under the pressure to be involved in the process of agreeing on the shape of the 
Maastricht Treaty. In addition, there was an international pressure to secure own 
security interests caused by major geopolitical changes such as the end of cold war, 
and dissolution of Warsaw Pact. This kind of pressure was a significant prerequisite for 
the UK’s government to start the process of uploading own vision of security 
architecture in the European Union, which finally took even a form of one specific 
provision that reassured the position of NATO in Europe. For the method chosen in the 
study – process tracing – it indicates that the hypothesis is confirmed since the factor X 
(British impact) shaped the mechanism M (uploading) therefore the outcome Y (the EU 
strategic culture shaped by the member state) occurred.  
The final conclusion from the first case states that with a lot of certainties we can say 
that without the active European policy of the UK at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
fundaments of the EU strategic culture expressed in TEU would have been different.     
 
3.3 Case 2 of ‘uploading’: The European Defense Strategy 2003 
The European Defense Strategy of 2003 (EDS) was selected as the second ‘defining 
moment’ in the study since it was the first the EU’s document of this kind. It has been 
replaced only by A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security 
Policy of 2016 which will be examined as the third ‘defining moment’ in this study.  
In terms of the data taken into account in this case, the timeframe ranges from early 
2001 up to the end of 2003. The supplementary source that is discussed here is the 
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UK’s The Strategic Defence Review White Paper of 1998 that was still valid during the 
European debate on the EDS.   
Empirical analysis 
On the general level, it can be noticed that the security and defense issues were still 
important themes of the parliamentary debates in the UK at The Strategic Defence 
Review White Paper. In comparison to the early 1990s, however, one could observe 
that the UK’s government expressed regularly the willingness to complement the 
potential of the EU and NATO in regards to security and defense. However, this kind of 
discussion was always accompanied with the reassurance of the leading role of NATO 
that should not be replaced by the EU. Such kind of slight change of the attitude or 
rhetoric may be caused by the fact the strategic role of NATO in Europe had been 
already strongly confirmed in TEU and there was no strong party in Europe able (or 
even ready) to change it. Moreover, in the early 1990s, there could be still certain 
uncertainty regarding the type of threats for the western international community. 
Still, the cold war understanding of potential threats could play a role, while in the 
early 2000s the character of threats has changed. In the year 2003, the ‘war on terror’ 
has been already launched by President George W. Busch and the invasion of Iraq 
started. Therefore, the member states could feel that there is a need to type of 
cooperation in addressing these threats since the conventional conflict in Europe 
seemed not to be possible. It is reflected also in the British parliamentary debate on 
security and defense issues in which the often repeated opinion was that no state can 
deal with contemporary threats alone. Therefore there was an atmosphere of 
necessity to act together. 
Already in June 2001, the UK’s Prime Minister stated, commenting the results of the 
European Council meeting in Gothenburg: 
(…) we discussed the progress which has been made in developing Europe's capacity for 
crisis management operations where NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged. 
President Bush made clear his view that the development of this capacity will 
strengthen European security. We agreed on the need to assure the EU's access to 
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NATO's planning capabilities, which is key to ensuring that the European Union's 
security and defence policy is firmly linked to NATO (House of Commons: 21st June 
2001) 
The UK has expressed its interest in keeping the balance between the EU and NATO, 
while in fact the key role was ascribed still to NATO, as it was stated by Secretary of 
State for Defence if the European Defence Force:  
Heads of State and Government agreed at Nice that the EU military staff will not have 
an operational planning function. They also agreed that NATO will carry out 
operational planning for EU-led operations that have recourse to NATO assets and 
capabilities. Operational planning for other operations may be carried out in existing 
national and multinational headquarters, such as the UK's permanent joint 
headquarters at Northwood (House of Commons: 9th July 2001) 
However, the key attitude toward the use of force was presented during the debate on 
NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI):  
The UK is pressing for an intensified programme of work on the DCI over the coming 
months. The UK's own DCI performance has been strong, with some 60 per cent. of DCI-
related Force Goals being fully implemented and a further 30 per cent. being partially 
implemented. This reflects capability enhancements such as the introduction of the C17 
strategic transport aircraft, the acquisition of a greater sealift capability and 
development and procurement of new precision guided munitions (House of Commons: 
11th July 2001) 
The debate on security and defense issues between 2001 and 2003 has shown also 
how the UK’s attitude toward the use of force has evolved. In contrast to the early 
1990s, these debates were more specific. The types of operational capabilities and 
forces to be developed were often the themes of the discussions in the British 
parliament:  
(…)The need for multiple, concurrent small to medium-sized operations will, therefore, 
be the most significant factor in force planning. Counter-terrorism and counter-
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proliferation operations in particular will require rapidly deployable forces that are able 
to respond swiftly to intelligence and achieve precise effects in a range of environments 
across the world (…) 
Expeditionary operations on that scale can be conducted effectively only if United 
States forces are engaged. When the United Kingdom chooses to be involved, we would 
want to be in a position to influence their political and military decision making (…) 
the key to retaining interoperability with the United States, for our European allies as 
well as for the United Kingdom, is likely to rest in the successful operation of NATO's 
new Allied Command Transformation (…) 
in today's environment success will be achieved through an ability to act quickly, 
accurately and decisively, so as to deliver military effect at the right time (…) 
It follows that we no longer need to retain a redundancy of capability against the re-
emergence of a direct, conventional strategic threat to the United Kingdom. Our 
priority must now be to provide the capabilities to meet a much wider range of 
expeditionary tasks, at a greater distance from the UK (House of Commons: 11th 
December 2003) 
The examples above show the combination of the elements of the UK’s strategic 
thinking at that time. One can observe here at least two key elements of the UK’s 
strategic culture: the balancing between the Atlanticist and Europeanist approach to 
foreign policy as well as the willingness and ability to act globally as a part of great 
power legacy. Two other key elements: multilateralism and evolutionary change 
instead of revolutionary are rather present not directly. On the other hand, one may 
argue that all new security arrangements at the EU level are rather a continuation of 
the path settled in 1993 in TEU than a radical change of approach.  
The discussion on the priorities of the international strategy for the UK that take place 
in ate 2003 has brought us at least initial understanding of multilateralism as one of 
the key elements of the UK’s strategic culture:  
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We will work through the UN, the EU, the G8, NATO, the Commonwealth and other 
groups. We shall also aim to build stronger strategic partnerships with Russia, China, 
Japan, and India, bilaterally and through the EU. One of our top priorities will be to 
engage constructively with Islamic countries (House of Commons: 2nd December 2003). 
However, the discussion on the UK’s armed forces in the same year has also shown 
that in terms of attitude the use of force, the UK’s involvement in serious military 
operation is almost entirely dependent on the decisions and actions of the United 
States:  
Our policy is to continue to develop balanced, flexible forces able to undertake a wide 
range of military tasks, normally alongside the forces of other NATO and EU countries, 
in support of the United Kingdom's security objectives, but, as I have repeatedly said, it 
is highly unlikely that the UK would be engaged in large-scale combat operations 
without the United States (House of Commons: 3rd November 2003) 
Finally, commenting on the European Defense Strategy itself, The Secretary of State 
for Defence stated that: 
There is no reason why support for NATO and support for the European defence policy 
need be mutually inconsistent. Indeed, as the United States has recognised in its 
approval of the Berlin plus arrangements, the two are complementary: by improving 
European defence capabilities, we are also improving the ability of European nations to 
contribute to NATO—something that the United States would like to see (ibid.)  
It does not come as a surprise that most of the standpoints on the security and 
defense, as well as the use of force expressed by British decision-makers in the period 
2001-2003, were in compliance with Strategic Defense Review of 1998 (with 
amendments in 2002). Among the key priorities, the document lists the shift towards 
rapid deployable armed forces and “jointery”. “Jointery” is defined as a series of 
initiatives across defense to co-ordinate the activities of the three services more closely, 
pooling their expertise and maximising their punch, while at the same time eliminating 
duplication and waste (Dodd and Oakes: 1998, p. 3).  
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The content of European Defence Strategy 2003 
The relation between expectations of British politicians towards the use of force by the 
EU and the content of European Defense Strategy of 2003 is of a different character 
than it was in the case of TEU. There are no such evident examples of UK’s uploading 
as it was in 1993. One of the explanations of such a situation could be that since 
Maastricht Treaty the fundamental British postulate (NATO as the main pillar of 
European security architecture) was secured and there was no attempt to change it. 
Nevertheless, the special relationship between NATO and the EU as well as the EU and 
the United States had been underlined in the document:  
The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular, Berlin Plus, enhance the 
operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic 
partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our 
common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century (European Defense 
Strategy: p.13) 
The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and 
the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an 
effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU 
to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence. (European Defense 
Strategy: p. 14) 
One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. 
This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as 
a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship (European Defense 
Strategy: p.10) 
More visible aspect, in this case, is the link between British parliamentary debate on 
security, defense, the use of force and the general “spirit” of the EDS. The examples of 
the UK’s government standpoint, presented above are very alike to the content of the 
EDS. It applies, for instance, to the perception of threat, military forces to be 
developed or types of missions that are needed:  
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In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are 
near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and 
proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe. Terrorists and criminals 
are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or southeast Asia may be 
a threat to European countries or their citizens (European Defense Strategy: p.6) 
In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is 
purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means (European Defense 
Strategy: p.8) 
(…) To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to 
address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of 
resources are necessary (European Defense Strategy: p.13) 
Multilateralism mentioned earlier as one of the key elements of the British strategic 
culture had been also reflected in the analyzed EU’s document:  
In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and 
prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system (European Defense 
Strategy: p.13)  
Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and the International Financial Institutions (European Defense Strategy: p.10) 
In particular, we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, 
Canada, and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are 
prepared to act in their support. (p.15) 
It is also worthy to note that EDS indicates that the EU needs to develop own strategic 
culture that would include the elements listed above: 
We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, 
robust intervention (p.12) 
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The assessment of the analysis of the second ‘defining moment’ of the study is 
twofold. On the one hand, one may argue that the UK was an active actor in 
developing the EU arrangements towards the use of force at the turn of XX and XXI 
centuries. The UK as one of the greatest military power in the world with the ability to 
act globally and having a special relation with the global leader – the United States – 
could be somehow naturally interested in continuation of shaping the EU strategic 
culture, especially after having an impact on the decision on the use of force enshrined 
in the TEU. On the other hand, the analysis conducted above does not show 
unambiguously that the shape of the European Security Strategy was done by the 
United Kingdom. In this case, the UK did not point out specific provisions that should 
be included in the EU strategic document. The debate on foreign policy, defense and 
security were undoubtedly dense in the years 2001-2003 but there is no such strong 
evidence of coalition building or formal and informal meetings organized to secure 
British approach to the strategic culture at the EU level.  
Therefore, regarding the research design of this study, the most important conclusion 
is that there is a visible link between British strategic thinking and the content of 
European Defense Strategy but the hypothesis is not fully confirmed since it cannot be 
clearly demonstrated that there was British uploading. One may properly argue that it 
was rather a process of downloading and the British government was a recipient of the 
arrangements concluded at the EU level, than a “sender” of a specific approach to the 
use of force. The additional argument for such an explanation is that the period 
between 2001 and 2003 was marked with rather a high degree of uncertainty in the 
global politics. Therefore, perhaps some of the EU member states could be interested 
in making own approach to the use of force more coherent with a collective actor such 
as the EU.  
While the analysis shows that the UK’s uploading could play a role in shaping the 
European Defense Strategy, additional research would be needed to exclude or 
confirm other possible explanations, especially downloading.     
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3.4 Case 3 of ‘uploading’: A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and 
Security Policy 2016 
The third ‘defining moment’ stands out from the previous two. It is mainly because of 
the character of the discussion on security and defense issues in the UK’s parliament in 
the period taken into account in this case that is the turn of 2015 and 2016. The most 
decisive element of the context, in this case, was the British referendum on the exit of 
the European Union. In regards to the international context, Europe has faced the 
challenge of the influx of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa. The so-called 
migration crisis set the tone of the debate on the European security.  
Empirical analysis 
The analysis of the primary source of this case has revealed that the debate on security 
and defense issues in regard to the European Union was less dense than in two 
previous cases. It is especially visible in the year 2016 in which a major thread of the 
debate was British referendum about Brexit. Paradoxically, it was debated more 
frequently what could be possible scenarios for the UK after possible Brexit in regards 
to cooperation with the EU.  
Nevertheless, the analysis of a Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 
2016 brings some arguments for a persistence of the UK’s uploading of the elements of 
own strategic thinking at the EU level.  
During the parliamentary debate in 2015 and 2016 the issues regarding defense and 
security were concentrated, again, on the unquestionable role of NATO in defining the 
EU approach to use of force:  
The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon): NATO is the cornerstone of the 
United Kingdom’s defence. The European Union plays an important complementary 
role in supporting NATO’s response to international crises, by applying economic, 
humanitarian and diplomatic levers that NATO does not have. The Government, 
therefore, believe that the United Kingdom’s continued membership of a reformed 
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European Union will make us safer and stronger (House of Commons: 29th February 
2016). 
The debate took place in the atmosphere of waiting for the results of the announced 
referendum regarding the exit of Great Britain from the European Union. Even then, 
British politicians sought to assure that if the United Kingdom remained in the Union, 
the government would counteract initiatives to create a European army that would 
consequently have to mean the independence of the European Union from NATO: 
Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con): Does my right hon. Friend accept that by 
advancing the rather quaint idea that somehow our membership of the EU enhances 
our national security, he is merely playing into the hands of people such as Mr Juncker 
and Chancellor Merkel who, if Britain votes to remain in the EU, would advance 
towards a European army and permanent structured co-operation, the result of which 
would be to undermine NATO—the very organisation that the Secretary of State says is 
the cornerstone of our national defence? (House of Commons: 29th February 2016). 
Michael Fallon: We have made absolutely clear that we would not support any move 
towards a European Union army of the kind that my hon. Friend suggests. These two 
organisations have different memberships and slightly different objectives. As I have 
said, NATO is the key part and cornerstone of our defence, but legal, economic, 
diplomatic and humanitarian levers are available to the European Union that NATO 
does not have. Being a member of both gives us the best of both worlds. (House of 
Commons: 29th February 2016). 
The above standpoints were also addressed during the discussions on the EU global 
strategy itself. The example below shows also how uploading may work in practice. It is 
a description (presented in front of the British parliament) of the informal meeting of 
Foreign Ministers of the EU – informal in a sense it did not require a common 
standpoint afterward. But it shows how the countries may use all the possibility to 
address issues which are of particular importance for them:  
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EU Defence and Foreign Ministers met at a joint working lunch to discuss progress in 
the drafting of the strategy. Ms Mogherini stated her intention to produce a strategy 
that was broader than just security issues and covered the range of priorities for the 
EU. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Minister for Reserves highlighted 
the UK’s strategic defence and security review (SDSR) and commitment to spend 2% on 
defence and 0.7% on development. He said it was important that Europe should look 
first to NATO for its defence (House of Commons: 11th February 2016) 
Before the assessment of the link between British strategic thinking and the content of 
a Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016, it is worth quoting the 
speech of the UK’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, from February 2016. The speech 
shows that UK was concentrated rather on the reform of the EU as a whole and the 
security and defense issues are not even taken as a possibility to become more 
Europeanized. The only element of the British strategic thinking that was repeated 
regularly is the role of NATO as a fundament of the European approach to the use of 
force which in fact excludes the possibility of strengthening the EU separate military 
capabilities:  
(…) in the parts of Europe that work for us, and out of those that do not; in the single 
market; free to travel around Europe; and part of an organisation where co-operation 
on security and trade can make Britain and its partners safer and more prosperous, but 
with guarantees that we will never be part of the euro, never be part of Schengen, 
never be part of a European army, never be forced to bail out the eurozone with our 
taxpayers’ money, and never be part of a European superstate. ((House of Commons: 
3rd February 2016) 
The content of A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016 
The assessment of this ‘defining moment’ starts with the look how the EU has defined 
the link between own security capabilities and those brought by NATO: 
When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most 
Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security 
and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO. The EU will therefore 
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deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and 
full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making 
autonomy of the two. In this context, the EU needs to be strengthened as a security 
community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act 
autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with 
NATO (A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (further: Global 
Strategy): 2016, p. 20).  
The strong role of NATO as a ‘primary framework’ can be assessed as a great deal of 
continuation in developing the EU’s strategic culture in comparison to the previous 
documents. Such a wording would not be arguably rejected by the UK’s government. 
However, it may be also interpreted as a harbinger of change when the Global Strategy 
says about the need to create security community that is able to act in a more 
autonomous way. It must be also noted that in 2016 there were also other member 
states that were adherents of maintaining the strong bonds with the United States and 
NATO, especially Central European states.    
There is also strong evidence of the will to act globally and in the multilateral 
environment by the EU:   
We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty and to champion 
the indivisibility and universality of human rights (…) (Global Strategy: p. 18) 
Co-responsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order 
(…) (Global Strategy: p. 18) 
Capabilities should be developed with maximum interoperability and commonality, and 
be made available where possible in support of EU, NATO, UN and other multinational 
effort (Global Strategy: p. 45) 
In terms of acting as an autonomous and independent actor, Global Strategy goes 
further than previous documents:  
To acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move 
towards defence cooperation as the norm. Member States remain sovereign in their 
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defence decisions: nevertheless, nationally-oriented defence programmes are 
insufficient to address capability shortfalls (…) (Global Strategy: p. 45) 
A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for 
Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP (Global Strategy: p. 46) 
It cannot be unambiguously drawn from the analysis whether it is due to the results of 
British referendum or other factors. The conclusion this study accepts is that the UK’s 
uploading was not that evident as in the previous ‘defining moments’. The UK’s 
somehow limited own influence on the shape of Global Strategy since the debate was 
concentrated on domestic issues related to the referendum about Brexit. On the other 
hand, it was arguably certain that the EU will not go in the direction of strengthening 
own military capabilities in a way that would make the EU fully independent actor 
from NATO. In fact, the rhetoric in the document is rather safe and one may find only 
some initial suggestions that it can be a potential path for the EU in future.  
From this perspective, this study makes one of the final conclusions that the beginning 
of the 1990s and negotiations of the TEU was a crucial moment in defining the EU 
strategic culture. In that period, the UK was strongly involved in transferring own 
elements of the strategic culture at the EU level. It resulted not only in the certain 
vision of security architecture shared by the EU but also in some formal provisions that 
exist in the Treaties until today.  
What we could observe in the cases of European Defense Strategy of 2003 and A 
Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 2016 is rather a continuation of 
uploading this vision of the EU’s use of force (as a part of the broader security system 
with NATO as fundamental actor).  
The final conclusion regarding the third ‘defining moment’ of the EU strategic culture is 
that even without such strong advocating the elements of own components of national 
strategic culture by the UK, one may argue that the general outlook of the document is 
in a compliance with the British strategic thinking. It might serve as an argument 
towards the persistence of the British impact on the EU strategic culture. This issue will 
be additionally discussed in the last part of the paper. However, in regards to the 
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research design the conclusion is similar as in the second ‘defining moment’ – the 
hypothesis cannot be confirmed since there is not enough clear evidence that the 
developments of the EU strategic culture in a Global Strategy are due to the UK’s 
uploading or other factors such like, again, downloading.  
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Part IV. Conclusions 
 
4.1 Discussion: The UK’s impact on the EU’s strategic culture 
The analysis of ‘three defining moments’ of the European Union strategic culture 
brings some conclusions about the link between a member state and the EU in regards 
to the use of force by the latter. It also reveals some characteristics of the EU’s 
strategic culture itself which will be discussed also in this section.  
Starting from the assessing the research design, the final conclusion is that process-
tracing combined with the concept of Europeanization has proved its explanatory 
potential in the study of the EU’s strategy culture. Especially in the case of Maastricht 
negotiations, it was clearly visible how a member state can influence the process in 
order to transfer the elements of own strategic culture at the EU level. It has to be 
noted that the set of elements that can be transferred is rather broad. It should not be 
limited to certain provisions or procedures but it refers also to less palpable elements 
such as the vision of the foreign policy or “way of doing things”.  
In the case of the UK, the vision of foreign policy and the way how the EU should act 
globally are the most significant elements that were shaped by British strategic 
thinking. In fact, all the changes in the EU’s strategic culture since the 1990s were of 
evolutional, gradual character which remains in compliance with the key elements of 
the British strategic culture discussed in section 3.1.  
Balancing Europeanist and Atlanticist vision of foreign policy was arguably the most 
significant achievement of the UK in regards to shaping the EU strategic culture. As this 
study argues, the moment it had taken place was Maastricht Treaty. This was a basis 
that allowed the UK to upload own vision of the use of force by the EU at later stages 
without such enormous contribution as it was in the early 1990s. The main conclusion 
from the analysis of the first ‘defining moment’ remains valid for the entire study: 
without the active European policy of the UK at the beginning of 1990s, the 
fundaments of the EU strategic culture expressed in TEU would have been different. 
Therefore with the high level of confidence, it might be stated that the EU strategic 
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culture, in general, would be different without the strong contribution of the United 
Kingdom. 
Regarding the hypothesis, the study makes the conclusion that it was confirmed in the 
first ‘defining moment’. While in the second and the third ‘defining moment’ the link 
between the UK’s and the EU’s strategic culture was found, however, additional 
research should be conducted since it cannot be unambiguously stated that there was 
a greater role of UK’s uploading than the EU’s downloading or by any other factors. 
The partial explanation that this study accepts and which found the confirmation in the 
literature on the concept of Europeanization (Graziano and Vink: 2013) is that the 
downloading and uploading (or bottom-up vs. top-down perspective) take place 
simultaneously. It should be a matter of further studies how to combine these two 
perspectives within one research.    
The research design in the study proved its promising potential to study the EU 
strategic culture. The model proposed here could be implemented to study the 
influence of other member states in shaping the EU strategic culture. Ultimately, the 
comparative analysis of different cases would be the most desirable type of research 
design that could bring the most comprehensive explanation of the dependent 
variable – the EU strategic culture.  
The answer to the research question is twofold. Firstly, it was empirically presented 
how the mechanism of shaping the European Union strategic culture by a member 
state works. Uploading is the key mechanism here, while it should be repeated that 
the character of uploading (the types of ‘elements’ that can be uploaded) may differ 
from one member state to another. Secondly, judging of the confirmation (or not) of 
the hypothesis in each ‘defining moments’ this study concludes that the UK has shaped 
the EU strategic culture towards the model which can be tentatively named as 
‘Atlanticist’. The most significant feature of this model is that the crucial decisions 
about the use of force by the EU are bonded with NATO. In such an arrangement the 
EU does not possess a fully independent position in regards to using the own military 
capabilities.  
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4.2 The EU strategic culture 
The last section is devoted to the discussion of the possible implications for the 
concept of the European Union that can be drawn from this study.  
Firstly, as it was mentioned in the first chapter this study accepts different perspective 
towards the EU strategic culture than most of the research in existing literature of the 
subject. This perspective is built on the separation of culture and behavior proposed by 
the third generation of scholars dealing with the concept of strategic culture. It means 
that the existence of the EU strategic culture should not be assessed on the basis of 
the mission undertaken overseas. The failure or the success of the mission should not 
be a criterion for (not) having a strategic culture since the situation itself in which an 
actor uses any type of military force which is at his disposal proves there was at least 
a cognitive process of designing the possibility to use force. This cognitive process is, in 
fact, the essence of strategic culture since the concept is about the attitude to use (or 
not) force.  
Secondly, as the analysis exemplified, the EU member states can be treated as bearers 
of the EU strategic culture. However, this study took the elitist (elites of a member 
state) perspective. It should be a matter of further studies what other bearers (or 
keepers to use Berger’s wording) could be distinguished. One of the most promising 
directions in this regard is the public opinion (European societies). It was discussed 
during the analysis that domestic pressure is one of the important prerequisites of a 
government’s active behavior at the EU level. Therefore the link between European 
public opinion and the EU strategic culture is an important part of further studies.  
Thirdly, further discussion on the EU strategic culture requires more focus on the 
issues of continuity and change. On the basis of the analysis from this study, it might 
be argued that the high level of continuity in developing the EU strategic culture is due 
to the influence of the UK. However, it is arguably interplay of different factors 
including the character of the decision-making process existing within the EU which 
can be described rather as gradual than rapid. However, it might be an interesting 
64 
 
research field whether Great Britain’s decision about the exit from the EU will 
contribute to the change of the EU strategic culture.  
Finally, it must be noted that this study does not aspire to give a comprehensive 
explanation how the EU strategic culture is being shaped. However, it shows how one 
of the factors (the role of a member state) works. One may argue that similar impact 
can come from a different factor and the answer which factor (if any) was decisive. 
This study agrees with this argument while it the role of the research here should be 
understood as the first step towards a comparative research of different factors that 
shape the EU strategic culture.   
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